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LIntroduction
One of the best-attested generalizations in demography is the high fertility
of rural populations relative to urban ones. For every state of the United
States throughout the twentieth century, indeed for practically every
Western country since the first half-reliable data have become available,
the rule holds (see Jaffe 1942; Okun 1958, p. 94; Petersen 1969, p. 496).
It is not viewed in the demographic literature as notably puzzling. Some
writers in fact treat the lower fertility of the urbanized population almost
as a postulate or definition: low fertility is part of the urban life-style.
Neither do economists interested in fertility find larger rural families an
especially perplexing phenomenon. Almost everyone would accept at least
a loose economic explanation in terms of lower costs and greater pecuniary
returns to child rearing on farms.
Probably the most salient fact about the recent history of U.S. rural
fertility is the erosion of the rural-urban differential since World War 11.1
Thereis no lack of plausible explanations. The decline in the value of
farm children as old-age support resulting from the extension of Social
Security to farm operators, increasing opportunities for labor-force par-
ticipation by farm women, the general relaxation of those characteristics
of rural life traditionally conducive to larger family size—such hypotheses
would seem, prima facie, reasonable to most economtits. Other social
scientists would probably agree by and large, though some might want
to put more weight on cultural or "taste" factors—for example, more
I want to thank P. R. Johnson and R. A. Schrimper as well as several authors of
papers in this book for their useful criticisms and suggestions.
'By the late 1960s the crude birth rate for rural-farm families had even fallen
below the urban rate. However, this is partly due to the changing age structure of
rural women. Age-specific birth rates of completed family sizes are moving closer
together for rural vis-à-vis urban residents, but rural completed fertilityremains
larger.
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rapid and complete diffusion of urban norms and attitudes into rural areas
via television and cheaper communication and transportation generally.
It is not easy, however, to demonstrate the importance of these factors,
much less to discriminate among them. The recently developed economic
theories of fertility based on an allocation of time in a home production
model provide a useful framework for dealing with these issues. I begin
this paper by discussing b.riefly the main contributions such a model can
make inclarifyingconceptually the economic determinants ofrural
fertility. I then present an analysis of some data pertaining to the fertility
behavior of North Carolina rural families.
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In reviewing the general features of the home production model, some
problems that arise in applying the model to cross-sectional data on family
size require comment. The dependent variable to be explainedisthe
number of children in completed rural families. This will be referred to
as "family size." To treat family size in terms of an economic model is
to treat it as a matter of choice in the face of the family's inevitably
limited resources. We will not be able to explain those variations in family
size that are random or determined by noneconomic factors outside the
model.
The size of a completed family is the outcome of many interdependent
decisions that are made (and revised) continuously by the family unit.
Perhaps the single most helpful feature of the home production model in
this context is the relative ease with which it allows one to classify ob-
servable variables as endogenous or exogenous. The finding of a stable
relationship between two mutually determined variables, say number of
children and wife's labor-force participation, would be interesting and
worth knowing about. But for purposes both of understanding and pre-
diction it is more satisfying to explain the-number of children by means
of factors not so likely to be themselves influenced by or determined
jointly with family size.2
The basic endogenous variables of the home production model, following
the now standard terminology, are the "Z's," the "commodities" which
enter the utility function. It seems most useful to view children, as is done
in the recent work of Willis (1969), Michael (1970), and De Tray
2 For example, one could "explain" higher fertility among farm families in part on
the grounds that women on farms are less likely to be in the labor force. But their
not being in the labor force is presumably a function of other, exogenous variables
having to do with the market for farm-women's labor. A more "fundamental" ap-
proach would be to explain both fertility and women's labor supply in an explicitly
simultaneously model like that of Nerlove and Schultz (1970), or, if one
wants to use a single-equation approach, by sticking to a reduced form having only
exogenous factors as independent variables.
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(1972b), not as Z's themselves, but as "intermediate commodities" which
are inputs in the production of a Z called "child services." This term
simply refers to whatever it is that people want children for. Nobody has
been able to say how to measure the quantity of child services, or even
what units they should be measured in. The usefulness of the theoretical
work cited is that it avoids the necessity for such measurement; it derives
relationships between the directly observable intermediate commodity,
number of children, and the exogenous economic variables. This derived-
demand approach seems to me an important advance, especially in think-
ing about the economics of investment in children, that is, in the child's
"quality."
The basic exogenous variables are the market prices of goods and time
and the endowment of full income or wealth. In addition, the technical
conditions of the home production functions themselves are exogenous
(though Michael's [1974] treatment of the effects of education on them
introduces elements of choice and pushes the exogenous technical condi-
tions back to the production of education). Special conceptual problems
are presented by the utility function when it has to represent a family
rather than an individual; if it incorporates the children's preferences it
has endogenous elements.
The exogenous variables that one might want to consider in explaining
rural fertility would include the prices of goods used in child rearing;
the wage rates of male, female, and child labor: and the budget constraint.
Commonly cited among these as encouraging relatively large rural-farm
families are lower prices of child-rearing goods and higher values of
children's time.3 De Tray (1972b, p. 46) argues further that high quality
children are likely to cost rural-farm families relatively more than they
do urban families.
Difficulties in Applying the Model
The first problem in applying the home production model is that it is
most rigorously and plausibly stated in static terms-whereas the facts we
observe are the results of market variables and decisions taken in response
to them on dates over a long sequence of time. What, for example, is the
appropriate budget constraint? It must ultimately be a wealth constraint,
but how and when should it be measured? The human and nonhuman
capital possessed by the family at the time we observe its completed size
can give a misleading picture; itis even endogenous to the extent that
The exogenous aspect should refer to the market for child labor, but for most
families there is only a shadow wage for children—their time is used only in the
home. For farmers, technical conditions of home production are probably such that
additional children do not drive down the shadow wage of children as quickly as for
urban families. In other words, there are reasons for expecting greater "economies of
scale" (or less diseconomies) in child rearing on farms.
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past accumulation has been influenced by the number of children. We
would ideally want to know the parents' endowments and expected future
income streams at the time family plans are made.
Likewise, we would require schooling and wage rates for the prefamily-
completion period if they are to be completely exogenous. The only truly
exogenous variables that we can observe contemporaneously with com-
pleted family size are age, race, and some other "background" variables.
But everyone follows the same age path, and race and original social class
are not elements that play any intrinsically important pal't in the home
production model.
We are left with only "base period" endowments and subsequent market
prices of goods and time as exogenous variables. A priori, itis difficult
to be very confident that these variables will explain a great deal of
family-to-family variation in completed fertility. We have only to con-
sider our everyday personal observation of people having greatly varying
family sizes that could not have been predicted from our knowledge of
differences in their past inheritance and present market conditions. This
does not mean of course that economic theories of fertility are unlikely
to be useful in predicting changes in fertility in larger population aggre-
gates where economic circumstances vary and other factors are relatively
constant. Moreover, such a state of affairs does not necessarily imply that
our understanding of fertility behavior would be improved by focusing on
noneconomic determinants of fertility. It still could be, and as far as I
can see is in fact the case, that explanation via market prices gives results
as satisfying as the possible alternatives.4 In all of this, rural fertility is
no different from urban (though it has been argued, generally without
direct evidence, that economic motivations in child rearing are more im-
portant for farm people). Indeed, in these respects child services are no
different in principle from other Z's one might want to investigate.
A second problem concerns not what variables to use but how to specify
the model. In this paper the concentration is on prices of time, since it is
difficult to measure cross-sectional variations in the prices of goods, and
there probably exists less such variation anyway than for the value of
time. Willis (1969) has shown that a change in the husband's full-time
earnings will affect the value of the wife's time if she spends no time
working. This result is analogous to Gronau's proposition (1970b, p. 9)
that "an increase in income results in an increase in the intrinsic price of
Sometimes it becomes somewhat arbitrary whether we call a variable "economic"
or not. For example, farmers who migrate to cities may have larger families than
urban natives even though their economic circumstances are essentiallythe same
(although Kiser f 1938], trying to isolate this phenomenon, finds no difference in his
sample, nor do Goldberg [1958] and Freedman and Slesinger [19611). This could be
interpreted as a noneconomic determinant of differential fertility. On the other hand,
if we ask why "tastes for large families" arise for farm people, one plausible answer
might be that the behavioral pattern was generated over a long time period by the
low price of children, and what we observe in the migrants is a difference between
short-run and long-run price elasticities of demand for children.
f
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time" when time spent working is fixed. Moreover, if there are several
"kinds of time," each limited in supply, we may observe "corner solutions"
in the use of some kinds of time even for women who are in the labor
force, with different prices for different kinds of time. In such cases the
home production model is complicated by interactions among the various
prices which may require a more complex specificationfor empirical
purposes.
Third, following through the derived-demand approachtochildren
yields a model for which a priori predictions about the signs of the coeffi-
cients of prices are not intuitively obvious, even without the above inter-
actions. This makes it difficult to test the model, because if a prediction
fails we do not know if the variable in question really should be rejected
as a determinant of fertility or if we simply made an incorrect restriction
of the model so as to make the prediction.
The latter two problems reflect the fact that the theory on the econom-
ics of family size has outrun the data available to test it. A few years ago
theory was lacking for adequate understanding of even the basic em-
pirical regularities that had been observed, notably the inverse relation-
ship between income and fertility. But as the theory has been advanced,
data suitable for observing its implications are becoming harder to find,
and the data we do have cannot be interpreted unambiguously in terms
of the theory. The situation is rather like a general equilibrium system
being worked out within each family; any exogenous change that affects
one price affects all prices. Moreover, as the theory advances, fewer of
the observed characteristics of a family are taken as exogenous.
In this spirit, then, I will not make any predictions about the signs of
coefficients in the regressions to follow, since almost anything could be
justified ex post. The hypothesis testing will be of a rather loose sort—to
see what light can be thrown upon rural fertility behavior by means of
the exogenous variables which the home production model suggests ought
to be important. This does not mean, however, that the usefulness of the
home production model has to be viewed as a maintained hypothesis
throughout. It would look bad for the model, assuming we have the data
to specify it adequately, which in this sample I think we do, to find insig-
nificant coefficients on the variables •representing the price of children.
Failure on rural-farm data would be especially troubling in view of the
older sociological literature which found the correlation between economic
variables and fertility for families from farm backgrounds to be greater
thanfornative urbanfamilies(see Goldberg1958;Freedman and
Slesinger 1961).
Ill.Analysis of a Sample of North Carolina Rural Families
The basic data for the regression analysis which follows come from two
surveys of rural (farm and nonfarm) families in North Carolina. In the
T
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first, the Research Triangle Institute of North Carolina surveyed 1,170
families for the U.S. Department of Agriculture in1968. The sample
space was the whole of North Carolina. The sampling methods were quite
exhaustive and may have resulted in even better coverage, especially of
poor and black families, than has been achieved by the U.S. census (see
Research Triangle Institute [RTI] 1971for details).I surveyed the
second sample of 214 rural (farm and nonfarm) residents of Sampson
County, North Carolina, in 1971. Though my sampling procedure was
less sophisticated than that used in the RTI survey, the original list of
names being drawn from the county tax office records, the sample means
for age, race, and education appear to be in line with census data for
the county (see Gardner 1971).
Neither of these samples was drawn specifically to investigate com-
pleted rural fertility; consequently, many observations were not usable
because the families were not yet complete when observed or they had
been completed too long. This last problem is especially serious in the
RTI sample because the survey questionnaire asked only about children
living at home during at least some part of the year. By the time parents
reach their upper forties, and certainly at older ages, their children start
leaving home permanently. My survey questionnaire asked about "chil-
dren-ever-born" so that this problem did not arise.
Unfortunately there is no way of knowing exactly which families are
observed at their completed size. I stratified by age of wife. All families
in which the wife was over 49 years old were eliminated. Because even
younger wives could have had some children who had left home, I strati-
fied further by means of length of time married. If a woman had been
married more than 5 years before the birth of the oldest child reported,
the observation was left out on the grounds that I had no precise idea
what the true family size was. To avoid eliminatingalllate-starting
families, this rule was not applied if the oldest child reported was 15 years
old or younger. Families who reported no children at all presented special
problems. Those with wives in their upper forties could easily have had
children who had left home. I arbitrarily excluded those in the age group
of 46—49. In some of the analysis below all women who reported zero
children are excluded.
In my own sample, too, even though the problems just discussed did
not exist because I asked about children-ever-born, women of 50 years
and over were excluded. This was done to be symmetrical with the RTI
data, and because many of these older families made childbearing decisions
in the 1930s and 1940s under conditions quite different from those facing
the rest of the sample but which could not be incorporated in the regres-
sion model.
For both samples there was the problem that many younger parents had
not completed their families when they were observed. Whatever is done
•1166 BRUCE GARDNER
about this fact, it will cause some problems. I simply left out all families
in which the wife was less than 30 years old. Because there would still be
women in their lower thirties included in the sample who had not yet
completed their families, the age of women was added as an independent
variable in the regression analysis to try to hold this effect constant.
Finally, 36 families were eliminated because data were missing for some
independent variable. These were almost all cases in which no husband
was reported present so there was no information on husband's wage and
schooling.
In sum, then, the dependent variable is observed for husband-wife
families in which the wife is 30—49 years old, with the exclusion of some
older women. This leaves 511 families from the original 1,384 covered in
the two surveys.
For both samples thereisquite complete information on economic
variables since both were constructed with a view to measuring the
economic status of rural families. For each family there are data on the 'ft
agesof husband, wife, and children, their schooling, their hours spent
working, wage rates, earnings and type of employment for any family
members who worked, and income received from all sources, including
income in kind from housing they owned and farm-grown food. In addi- —
tion,the RTI sample has data on consumer durables owned and many Z
items of consumption expenditure.
These data allow us to discriminate between the prices of the husband's E-'
time and of the wife's time, which are usually considered to have different
effects on the full price of children. Women's value-of-time intensity of
child-rearing activities is generally taken to be relatively greater than
men's. This condition,ifit holds, implies a relatively more negative I
regressioncoefficient on wives' than on husbands' price of time.
The market price which is the best observable approximation to the
opportunity cost of time in home production is the wage rate that could
have been earned. This wage rate is observable for those women who work, U,
buthow is it to be measured for those who do not? The only useful data
available are the years of schooling attained by them. Age or experience
might also be pertinent, but age varies too little in the sample and there
are no data on experience. Accordingly, the first regression (presented in
table 1) has the wife's schooling as an independent variable, along with
the husband's schooling, income, and age of women. The age of women L)
was added to try to adjust for the likelihood that younger wives had not
yet completed their childbearing. The coefficient of income is intended to
represent a relaxation of the budget constraint, wage rates held constant.
A second set of regressions is estimated for working women. In this
case the same independent variables are used but women's wage rates are
added. This raises the question: If a woman's schooling is a proxy for
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3? One interpretation is that schooling changes a woman's tastes, perhaps
decreasing demand for child services or increasing the demand for child
relative to child numbers. But other possible explanations for
this effect arise directly from the home production model. These will be
discussed below.
In general, the results of regressions 1—4 seem reasonable. The R2s in
neighborhood of 20 percent are not bad for observations of individual
families. The variables usually considered central to an economic model
• ffertility—women's schooling, wage rates, and family income—are all
gnificant at the 5 percent level throughout. The elasticities of the number
f children with respect to them are: wife's wage, —0.20; wife's schooling,
----0.42 to —0.56; and family income, .26—.35.Husband'sschooling and
wage rates have negative signs but are not always significantly different
from zero. Race is significant, nonwhites having something over one more
child per completed family than whites, other things equal. These latter
issues also will be discussed further below.
Note on the income variable.—The RTI data allow three different
income measurements to be made: first, total money income (both before
and after taxes); second, income from sources other than labor earnings
and self-employment; third, a "Fisherian" income measure—current con-
sumption expenditures plus imputed flows to owned consumer durables
and housing. Regression coefficients of any of the three should indicate
the consequences of relaxing the budget constraint, wage rates held
constant.
All of these measures, however, create problems. They are all observed
contemporaneously with family size and so are not completely exogenous
if having children affects subsequent income. Moreover, the "other-income"
measure suffers because over half the sample reported negligible amounts
(less than of such income. Money income also has serious prob-
lems; it is notoriously unstable and ill-measured for rural-farm families.
This leaves the third, the "Fisherian" measure, which is the one used in
regressions 1—4. This measure could also be appropriately described as an
index of "permanent consumption" and, as such, linearly related to perma-
nent income. Also, it seems more likely to be an indicator of the family's
expected lifetime-income stream than the other two income measures.
Therefore, the permanent-consumption measure may be the best available
proxy for the lifetime-budget constraint as seen during the family forma-
tion years.
Table 2 presents the simple correlation coefficients among the three
alternative income measures, with the sample mean and standard deviation
of each. For purposes of comparison of the three as independent variables
in explaining family size, the bottom three regressions of table 1 use the
alternative income variables. The permanent-consumption measure per-
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TABLE 2
CORRELATION CoEFFIciENTs AMONG ALTERNATIVE INCOME MEASURES, 1968,









Money income .03 .64 —.12 5,502 4,065
Nonlabor income* .12 .07 288 782
Value of consumptiont ... —.02 5,360 2,286
Excludes allself-employment income from farm or nonfarm business as well as wage earnings.
tExpenditures on nondurable consumption items and imputed flows to owned housing andconsumer
durables.
ithas a greater t-value (comparing regressions 5 and 7) and yields a
higher estimated income elasticity. This probably is a consequence of the
errors-in-variables problem with annual money income that has arisen in
estimates of consumption functions and in many other contexts.5 This
problem is generally believed to be especially severe for farmers because
of the substantially greater variability of their incomes (Reid 1952).
Note from table 2 how much greater the standard deviation of money
income is than that of consumption in the present sample.
An Alternative Measurement of the Price of Time
Although these data provide more information about some economic
determinants of fertility, particularly on wage rates and income, than has
usually been the case in other studies, we still have not satisfied the
caveats expressed above about using independent variables which are
exogenous and timed appropriately. These wages and incomes are observed
after the family is formed. And they may to some extent depend upon or
be mutually determined with family size. One who has no children may
choose to work less; one who chooses a larger family also chooses more
work, and hence more income. The choice of investing in schooling may
be part of the same decision as the choice of a smaller family.
The use of the permanent-consumption measure of the budget con-
The behavior of the husband's-schooling coefficient in comparing regressions 5
and 7 provides some evidence for this interpretation. Husband's schooling may be a
reasonably good proxy for the "true" lifetime husband's-income constraint. Therefore,
its coefficient is biased in the positive direction when income isleft out or poorly
measured. In fact, the male-schooling coefficient changes from significantly negative
to insignificant as we move from the permanent consumption (regression 5) to annual
money income (regression 7) measure. Moreover, other studies, including my own
earlier work on state-level aggregate rural-farm populations (1972), show a positive
sign on male schooling when annual money income is used as the budget constraint.170 BRUCE GARDNER
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straint may avoid some of the problems. The most important variable to
consider, however, because of its central place in economic theories of
fertility, is the women's wage rate. To the extent that wives' schooling
holds constant differences in wage rates arising from that source, a sub-
stantial fraction of the remaining variation in wage rates in this sample
is probably due to variation in experience on the job. But this experience
will undoubtedly be negatively correlated with family size. Therefore we
will tend to find, ceteris paribus, smaller family size associated with higher
wage rates of women aged 30—49, whether or not the relative price of
children makes a difference in family size via the home production model.
While variation in experience might not be all that important in explaining
the differences in wage rates observed in this sample, it at least qualifies
the extent to which a negative coefficient on women's wage rates can be
taken as a confirmation of the allocation-of-time theory of family size.
Of course it is one thing to raise such problems but quite another to do
something about them. In what follows I propose to do something by
considering the labor market in which the family is located. Instead of
measuring the woman's market wage as that which she earns, I shall
introduce the average market-wage rates in the area. How does this proce-
dure avoid the possibility of spurious correlation? First, in order for the
problem to arise, there must be reasons for variation in family size outside
the economic model as specified in the regressions. Such reasons there
surely are, since more than 75 percent of the variance in family size is
unexplained in table 1. This variance may be conveniently ascribed to
"tastes" (though other factors, such as errors in achieving desired family
size must play a role, too). Given variance in tastes for children, the
experience effect will generate spurious negative correlation between ob-
served wage rates of women and family size. The use of market aggregates
reduces this spurious correlation to the extent that variations in tastes
cancel out in the aggregation. There may still exist variation in tastes
between markets, but this should be a much less serious problem. In fact,
we have direct evidence on this: namely, the much lower unexplained
variation in state or county aggregate-level regressions than in regressions
on individual families (R2 of .7—.8 in De Tray .[1972b] and Gardner
119721 compared with .2—.3 in table 1 above). Similar results, of course,
are observed in many other contexts as we move from aggregate to indi-
vidual data.
An aggregate market wage has the further advantage of being observable
for earlier years when the families sampled were in the process of being
formed. This also should make such a wage rate more nearly the exogenous
variable that we want.
An average market-wage variable, however, has problems of its own.
Since we are dealing entirely with families residing in a single state,
one might first of all quest
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one might first of all question how far the market price of time of given
quality can vary in this sample; and if the average wage does vary from
place to place, which it does, the natural reaction isto attribute the
differences to variations in average skills or human capital. Certainly
there will be a lot of variation in county cross-sectional wage rates that
is not useful for present purposes.
Another problem is even if there does exist more than 'one labor market
in North Carolina—even if more than one market price for time of given
quality has persisted for many years—how can we tell what the appro-
priate market area is?
I use counties. This unit was easiest because each family in the sample
is identified by county of residence, and there are average market-wage
data available by county. The best such data pertaining to the rural
population are those of the 1964 Census of Agriculture on earnings of farm-
operator families in off-farm employment (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1967, vol. 1, pt. 26, county table 7). The data are:(i) aggregate wages
and salaries received by persons in farm households;(ii) aggregate days
worked off farm by (a) farm operators and by (Ii) other persons in farm
households; and (iii) aggregate income of persons other than farm opera-
tors from off-farm sources. Dividing (i) by (ii)gives an average daily
off-farm wage rate. From these data one can also estimate husbands' and
wives' wage rates separately. Women's wages are estimated by dividing
income (iii) by (iib). Unfortunately, income (iii) includes nonlabor earn-
ings, the amount of which is not given by county but which the census
state data (vol. 2, chap. 5, table 23) reveal to be 19 percent for North
Carolina. Furthermore, "other persons" includes children who work for
wages.
These problems of measurement, together with the variations which
undoubtedly exist in the quality of labor from county to county, cause
considerable trepidation about the efficiency of the county-wage variable.
Nonetheless it still has the advantage in testing the home production model
of being a more nearly exogenous market wage. The many sources of error
may cause superfluous variation in the county wage and may cause the
regression coefficient to be insignificant, but they will not induce a spuri-
ous negative correlation between the wage rate and family size. The only
evident systematic error is the inclusion of children's earnings. But this
will tend to bias the wage coefficient in the positive direction, that is,
toward zero. Anyway, this effect may be minimized by what is surely a
very high correlation between wives' and children's county average wage
rates in off-farm work. Children's wage rates, if we could measure them
separately, would probably be a pretty good proxy for wives' wage rates
in the county data.
In fact, husbands', wives', and children's wage rates are all probably
highly collinear in the county data, so that each could do as a proxy for
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anyother.° Therefore, it may not be true that the county wage variable
represents wives' time per se. Rather, we are observing something closer
to the effect of the price of time-in-general on family size.
Regression results.—The county-wage variable, in addition to providing
a more nearly exogenous market-wage rate, has the desirable property of
allowing us to observe a market price of time for women who do not work.
Thus regressions 8 and 9 of table 3 include all families rather than work-
ing-wife families only, as isthe case in the corresponding regressions
(3 and 4) in table 1. The regression coefficients, t-values, and explanatory
power of regressions S and 9 are all basically similar to regressions 3 and 4.
The main differences are:the husband's-wage and schooling variables
have become significantly negative and have larger (in absolute value)
elasticities in 8 and 9; the elasticity of family size with respect to income
increases from around .3 in regressions 3 and 4 to .38 in regressions 8 and
9; the elasticity with respect to the women's wage has increased from —.2
to around —.6 when the exogenous county "women's" wage is substituted
for the working women's own particular wage-rate earned.
Regression 9 differs from 8 only in that 9 leaves out all families report-
ing zero children. The zero-child families present special problems because
the inadequacies of the RTI data required some extra adjustments of the
families included, as discussed above. In addition, the existence of infertil- Z
itymight mitigate the "choice" aspects of this class, or at least make it a
somewhat different kind of choice. However, less than 10 percent of the
sample families had zero children, and the regression results are practically
identical when these are left out. 0
ThePrice of Purchased Time
A surprising aspect of the county-wage variable is that it yields an elas-
ticity greater (in absolute value) than the wife's own wage, whereas all
the preceding discussion has suggested an elasticity closer to zero for the
county wage. One partial explanation of this result is that the spurious
negative correlation between the wife's own wage and family size is em-
pirically negligible. But this cannot explain the absolutely greater county-
wage elasticity. The most likely explanation is that there is simply less
opportunity for substituting hired time for own time when the general
wage level rises than when only one's own wage rate rises. This explana-
tion is consistent with the greater elasticity of family size with respect to
I estimated men's county-wage rates separately by applying the 19 percent to each
county's figures for (iii), subtracting from (i), and dividing by (iia). To the ertent
that the 19 •percent figure varies from county to the error in the wives'
estimated earnings will induce an error of opposite sign in the husband's earnings. Even
so, the correlation coefficient between their estimated wage rates is .74. On state data,
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women's wages (—0.3to—0.5) that I found in state-level rural-farm
data (1972).
This explanation, however, does not fit straightforwardly into the home
production model as utilized up to this point because we have considered
only one kind of woman's time. Therefore, there can be only one price of
such time in equilibrium, and the own- and county-wage rates are just
two different ways of measuring it. However, if we introduce hired time
as a different kind of production factor, not a perfect substitute for own
time, which can have its own price, then we do have a reason for expecting
a more negative elasticity on the aggregate county wage than on the
wife's own wage.
This line of thought can be pursued empirically by including both wage
rates at once, that is, by adding the wife's own wage as an independent
variable to regression 8. This can be done, as in regression 10 of table 3,
only for women who worked so that their wage rate is observable. It turns
out that, indeed, both wage rates are significantly negative.
Working and Nonworking Wives
Although the county wage is observable for nonworking wives, so that it
was possible to include them in regressions 8 and 9, still this wage rate
must have a different meaning for them. The marginal value of non-
workers' time in home production is presumably greater than the wage
rate they could earn. Therefore, variations in the market wage, as long
as it stays below their reservation wage, should make little difference
to them.
Table 3 presents separate regressions (11 and 12)for working and
nonworking wives. The most immediately strikingthing about these
regressions is their similarity. The model does at least as well at pre-
dicting the family size of nonworking as of working wives. It should be
noted, however, that the use of a single cross section of data does not
give us exactly the division of the sample that we would like.
working when their families were completed may not have been working
in earlier years, and vice versa. Even so, some coefficients are different
for the two groups: the county-wage. variable is insignificantly different
from zero for nonworking wives, and income and husband's schooling are
less important in the working-wife regression. A joint test of the signifi-
cance of the difference between these coefficients, under the maintained
hypothesis that the coefficients of all the other variables are the same,
allows a rejection of their equality at the 5 percent level.
Farm-Operator Families
The analysis up to this point has made no distinction between rural resi-
dents and farmers although there does exist a sizable rural-nonfarm
NORTH CAROLINARURAL F
population in the sample.
reported farming astheir
useful in exploring rural
model because rural residen
kinds of relative price effe
Associated with rural resj
public services in ruralar
family size should beass
farm occupation; whereas,
from a less rapidly declini
increases depends on the u
When a dummy variab
for farm-operator families
a regression coefficient on
farm-family size of about
families, ceteris paribus;
significance; and virtually
pendent variables. The sa
and 3.1 for nonfarmers. T
variables of the model ex
between these two groups.
The significance of the f
for any particular interpre
are several alternative e
seem that the difference
are not primarily farmers
ment as such, since both
are lower prices of goods
likely to be the explanatio
goods costs for rearing ch
higher (about 3 percent
South). We are left with:
with farm operation and
quality relative to numbe
Some evidence supporti
Pennock's data for the
housing are about 1 perc
dren, while medical car
portation, and "other" c
latter as being relatively
there is some incentive
numbers on farms.
One-half child per Co
quence for such effectsBRUCE GARDNER NORTH CAROLINA RURAL FAMILIES 175
in state-levelrural-farm
btforwardlY into the home
ecause we haveconsidered
can be only oneprice of
rates are just
we introducehired time
erfect substitute for own
ave a reasonfor expecting
ounty wage than onthe
ly by including both wage
wage as anindependent
regression 10 of table 3,
ate is observable. It turns
y negative.
wives, so that it
Fad 9, still this wage rate
marginal value of non-
iy greater than the wage
the market wage, as long
lId make little difference
nd 12)for working and
iking thing about these
at least as well at pre-
rking wives. It should be
section of data does not
t we would like. Women
y not have been working•
coefficients are different
is insignificantly different
d husband's schooling are
joint test of the signifi-
ts, under the maintained
variables are the same,
at level.
action between rural resi-
a sizable rural-nonf arm
population in the sample. Indeed, only 113 family heads (22 percent)
reported farming astheirsolesourceofincome. The distinctionis
useful in exploring rural family size by means of the home production
model because rural residence and farm operation probably have different
kinds of relative price effects, none of which can be measured directly.
Associated with rural residence in general are the prices of goods and
public services in rural areas; in addition any "taste" factors in rural
family size should be associated with rurality per se rather than the
farm occupation; whereas, the hypothesized "economies of scale" arising
from a less rapidly declining shadow price of child time as family size
increases depends on the use of child time in farm work.
When a dummy variable (constant-term shifter only)is introduced
for farm-operator families inregression 8 of table 3, the results are:
a regression coefficient on the dummy of average completed
farm-family size of about one-half child greater than for other rural
families, ceteris paribus; a t-value of 1.9, indicating 5 percent level of
significance; and virtually no change in the coefficients of the other inde-
pendent variables. The sample means for family size are 3.6 for farmers
and 3.1 for nonfarmers. Thus differences in the values of the independent
variables of the model explain essentially none of the fertility difference
between these two groups.
The significance of the farm-operator dummy can only be weak evidence
for any particular interpretation of what caused the difference, since there
are several alternative explanations which cannot be ruled out. It does
seem that the difference between farm families and rural families who
are not primarily farmers cannot very well be due to rurality in environ-
ment as such, since both subsets came from the same communities. Nor
are lower prices of goods that are relatively important in child rearing
likely to be the explanation. In fact, the estimates of Pennock (1970) on
goods costs for rearing children (given quantities purchased) are slightly
higher (about 3 percent more for farm than rural-nonfarm children in the
South). We are left with: (a) the economies of child-time use associated
with farm operation and (b) the possibility that the relative price of child
quality relative to numbers is greater on farms.
Some evidence supporting the latter hypothesis can be extracted from
Pennock's data for the South. Her cost figures for food, clothing, and
housing are about 1 percent higher for farm than for rural-nonfarm chil-
dren, while medical care(private expenditures on) education, trans-
portation, and "other" costs are 6 percent higher on farms. Taking the
latter as being relatively intensively used in investments in child quality,
there is some incentive for production of less quality relative to child
numbers on farms.
One-half child per completed family might seem a rather large conse-
quence for such effects as (a) and (b). But remember that mobility into1..
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and out of farming is probably quite easy for this population. If the scale
effect exists, people who desire larger families for whatever reason may be
attracted to farm operation. To this extent the farm-nonfarm division has
endogenous elements.
To investigate further the behavior of farm families, a separate regres-
sion, presented in table 4, was estimated for this group. The results differ
from the complete-sample regressions: although R2 is quite a bit higher
the coefficient of wife's schooling is insignificant. The coefficient of hus-
band's schooling, however, is strongly negative.
The behavior of family size as the wife's schooling changes can be seen
better when dummy variables for schooling classes replace years of school-
ing entered linearly. The results for five classes are: 0—7 years of schooling,
+1.0 children relative to 8—11 years (t =2.0);8 years of schooling, +0.6
(0.8); 12 years, +0.3 (0.6); and more than 12 years, +1.3 (1.9). As
will be seen below, the behavior of these farm-operator families as we move
from 0—7 through 9—11 years of wife's schooling is the same as for the
other families in the sample. The difference is in the effect of 12 and more
years of schooling. For farm operators, this group has significantly larger
families. This results in a U-shaped partial relationship between wife's
schooling and family size, which explains why the coefficient on the linear
years-of-schooling coefficient is insignificantly different from zero while
the dummy variables are not. U)
NonwhiteFamilies
Race plays no intrinsic part in the home production model. But since a
nonwhite constant-term dummy has been included in every regression
presented, it seems pertinent to explore this subject. It was included, of
course, because it worked. In these regressions, nonwhites have larger corn-
pleted families than whites by about 1.3 children, ceteris paribus. This
result is not surprising; it has been observed in many studies of differential
fertility.
How, if at all, can this fact be explained in terms of the home production
model? The prospects, prima facie, do not look good. The sample means
for completed family size of 2.8 for whites and 4.3 for nonwhites yield a
gross difference of 1.5. Every regression estimated attributes most of this
1.5 to the nonwhite dummy, that is, the independent variables included do
not come near to explaining the fertility difference. Z
Onecomplication here is that some of the variables may not measure the
same things for nonwhites and whites. This is especially likely for school-
ing. Eight years of schooling, circa 1945—50, probably yielded less of
whatever it is that schooling yields for North Carolina nonwhites than for
their white cohorts. Furthermore, it may be that even holding (correctly
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appropriate for whites is not attainable, on average, for nonwhites. There-
fore, under the maintained hypothesis that the coefficient of age is the
same, a regression was estimated using a dichotomized white-nonwhite
variable for husband's schooling, wife's schooling, income, and the county
wage.
The results are presented in regression 16 of table 4. An F-test on the
residuals indicates that the regression coefficients as a group are signifi-
cantly different (at the 5 percent level) for nonwhites. The elasticities of
all the economic variables are larger in absolute value for nonwhites
(though the difference is not so great as appears from the coefficients
because nonwhites have less schooling and income, and larger families at
the mean). This model, however, does not explain much more of the white-
nonwhite difference in family size. This fact cannot be inferred directly
from the coefficient of the nonwhite dummy in regression 16 because the
coefficients differ and the mean values are far from the origin, to which the
5.7 figure refers. Evaluated at the overall sample means, regression 16
predicts nonwhites to have approximately 1.2 more children than whites,
ceteris paribus. Thus, only about 20 percent of the gross racial difference
is explained by this model. The remaining 80 percent could be a matter
of different relative prices facing nonwhites which the model did not
capture, different tastes, or greater differences between actual and desired
family size for nonwhites. There is some evidence that this last difference
does, in fact, exist, namely, the finding that fewer nonwhites practice
family planning while more have children they report as "unwanted."7
Sc/tooling and Family Size
Throughout the regression analysis the wife's schooling has been one of the
most consistently significant variables. Moreover, its coefficient has shown
remarkable stability. Though the specification of the model and the sample
of families included varies considerably in regressions 1—12, the elasticity
of family size with respect to wife's schooling never gets far from —0.5.
This is true even when the wife's wage rate is included (compare regres-
sion 2 with 4, 9, and 10).
Economists investigatingthefertility-schoolingrelationshipviathe
home production model have been inclined to view the wife's schooling as
an indicator of the value of her time. But the present results are in a sense
too good for this interpretation because the effect of schooling remains
practically the same when the observed price of the wife's market time is
7Kiser,Grabill, and Campbell (1968) found that "white-nonwhite differentials in
planning family size are greatest among couples on farms in the south.. .nearlyhalf
(48 percent) have had more pregnancies than the husband or wife wanted. This is
the highest prevalence of excess fertility for any socioeconomic group in this study"
(p. 49).
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held constant. I can think of three ways of fitting this result into the home
production model:
The first is that schooling affects the relative price of kinds of time
which are specific to home production—that we have a "corner solution"
even when the wife is working.
The second interpretation is that increases in schooling, with the wage
received held constant, are associated with increased psychic benefits in
work time. The appropriate opportunity cost for time to work
or home is increasingly understated (or decreasingly overstated) by the
market-wage rate as schooling increases.
The third interpretation turns not on specific kinds of time but on
specific activities. In particular, we can think along the lines of Michael
(1970) of sex and family size as a joint commodity for which schooling
increases the productivity of the wife's time more than in other Z-produc-
tion. (Michael's [1974] model would also allow schooling to reduce family
size even with neutral home-time productivity increases. But this would
require a negative income elasticity of demand for children, which is incon-
sistent with the regression results for this population.) An interesting varia-
tion on this third way of taking the negative effect of schooling when wage
rates are held constant is De Tray's (1972b) hypothesis that schooling
increases the productivity of home time relatively more in activities which
produce child quality.
There may well be merit in all of these interpretations. Some evidence
(see, for example, Gronau 1970b) suggests different values for work and
some nonwork time. My problem with such an interpretation as applied
to fertility is the seemingly great possibilities for substitution of child-
rearing activities among different kinds of time, including hired time. The
second interpretation seems most straightforward. The difficulty with it as
applied to the present results is that under this interpretation schooling has
a bigger impact on the psychic element of work time than it does on
market-wage rates. It is true that in this sample the simple correlation
coefficient between the wife's schooling and her market wage is low (.24).
But it is doubtful that the correlation with psychic returns is any higher.
The results for female schooling as well as the husband's schooling are
quite. consistent with increasing productivity in child-quality-producing
activities over and above the general increases in the productivity of time
as schooling increases. Unfortunately, this interpretation is observationally
equivalent to the hypothesis that increases in schooling increase parents'
desires for high-quality children. But this latter explanation is a matter of
tastes; it brings the explanation of the schooling results outside the home
production model per se (where it may indeed belong).
The third effect, increasing specifically the productivity of contraceptive
activities and thereby reducing the number of children produced "acci-
dentally," seems to have the greatest possibilities for explaining the con-
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sistencyand magnitude of the wife's-schooling variable within the home
production model. On this hypothesis we have some positive, though
indirect, evidence: the existence of exceptionally high incidence of excess
fertility (unwanted births) among rural southern nonwhites, coupled with
the exceptionally high elasticity of family size with respect to wife's educa-
tion in the regressions for nonwhites (14—15 of table 4).
One further experiment with education is to look at particular levels of
schooling by means of dummy variables. Although a dollar is a dollar,
years of schooling are not so interchangeable; therefore, suspicion arises
about the linear treatment of family size and schooling. Using six classes
of wife's schooling in regression 8 instead of years of schooling linearly
yielded the following dummy coefficients (with 1): 0—4 years of schooling,
1.8 (3.8); 4—7 years, 0.9 (2.9); 8years,0.7 (1.9); 12 years, —0.15 (0.6);
and 13 or more, —0.08 (0.2). These coefficients measure completed family
size relative to those women who completed 1—3 years of high school. The
coefficients of the other independent variables are virtually unchanged
from regression 8.
These results indicate a nonlinear relationship between schooling and
family size. After entering high school, additional education does not
reduce family size appreciably, ceteris paribus. I would say that this result
makes the psychic-wage explanation of schooling's effect less probable. It
would seem more likely that psychic-wage increases would be greater in
moving from 9—11 to 13—16 than from 0—7 to 9—11 years of schooling,
considering the moves in occupation that are typically made. But this is
only conjecture. Similar considerations make the taste-changing interpreta-
tion of schooling less appealing.
The husband's schooling presents problems analogous to those just
discussed, but it is not so important a variable in the regression analysis.
It is, however, usually significantly negative. Like the wife's schooling, its
coefficient is not greatly changed whether wage rates are held constant or
not. Here the contraceptive-efficiency explanation seems less likely, but
the nonpecuniary work benefits more so. A dummy-variable treatment of
male schooling yielded the following coefficients and t-ratios: 0—7 years of
schooling, 0.2 (0.6); 8 years, —0.6 (1.7); 12 years, —0.4 (1.3); 13+
years, —1.1 (2.2). For men's schooling there also appears to be non-
linearity, but here it is the upper years that are most important.
Interactions
The theoretical point that higher income increases the relative price of
kinds of time for which the supply is fixed is a most interesting implication
of the home production model. How important are such interactions in the
present data?
Some evidence is obtainable from the regressions of table 3 on working
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ns of table 3 on working
and nonworking wives. In the Willis formulation the coefficient on the hus-
band's wage ought to be more negative for the nonworking wives, but with
income held constant the husband's wage is presumably a pure relative-
price variable. Rather we should look to the income coefficient. But that
coefficientis greater, even significantly so,for the nonworking wives.
Husband's schooling, however, does act in the way predicted.
Another test suggested is to add interaction terms. Several of these were
tried on this sample, but the only one close to significant with a positive
sign was that between women's and men's schooling. In any case, this
procedure is at best an ambiguous test of the interaction hypothesis, as
Ben-Porath points out in this volume. Suppose that the "true" model
is nonlinear, say quadratic in one or more variables but contains no inter-
action terms, and that there exists collinearity among the independent
variables. Then an interaction term added to a linear regression will be
a proxy for a squared term and may be statistically significant even though
the true interaction is zero. Both conditions—nonlinearity and positive
correlation (correlation coefficient =.58)—aremet in the case of hus-
bands' and wives' schooling in this sample.
To get more direct evidence on interactions, the dummy-variable treat-
ment was extended to a separate classification for various joint combina-
tions of husband's and wife's schooling. This procedure allows a separate
set of wife's schooling/family size contrasts to be made for different levels
of husband's schooling. For a husband with 0—7 years of schooling, the
dummy coefficients (with t-values) are: 0—4 years of wife's schooling,
1.9 (3.9); 5—7 years, 1.3 (3.4); 8 years, 1.0 (2.2); 9—11 years, 0 (basis
for contrasts); and 12+ years, 0.3 (1.1). For a husband with 12+ years
of schooling, results are: 0—7 years of wife's schooling, 0.8 (1.1); 8 years
(only one observation); 9—11 years, 0 (basis for contrast);12 years,
—0.7 (2.3); and 13+ years, —1.0 (2.7). These comparisons are plagued
by the collinearity just as the interaction model was. There were no ob-
servations of women with 0—4 years of schooling married to men with 12+
years of schooling, and only one of a woman with 13+ years of schooling
wed to a man with 0—7. There were only six marriages between men with
12+ years of schooling and women with 0—7, which accounts for the low t
onthis dummy coefficient even though its value is 0.8.
In order to make more meaningful comparisons, the classes are collapsed
to three. The contrasts we then have in number of children by schooling
class relative to women and men with 8—11 years of schooling are shown in
table 5. Though collinearity still makes it impossible to get as sharp
contrasts as one would like, the point estimates of table S have interesting
implications for interaction and nonlinearity. Both the husband's and the
wife's schooling make a difference in family size. But the differences
induced by changes in the wife's schooling do not vary much with the hus-
band's schooling—there is no immediately apparent interaction in this182 BRUCE GARDNER
TABLE 5
DIFFERENTiALEFFECT OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF HUSBAND AND WerE





















NOTE—Income, race, and wage rates are held constant. Basis for all contrastsis the number of
children in familiesin whichboth husband andwifehad 8—11 years of schooling. Number of observa.
tiona in each cell is in parentheses.
sense. Furthermore, the nonlinearity in the wife's schooling arising from
the "flattening out" of the family size/schooling profile has largely dis-
appeared. Thus these data have the interesting property that if you look
for interactions alone, you find them; and if you look for nonlinearity
alone, you find it; but if you use a general framework that allows the
observation of both simultaneously, you find neither. The simple linear,
noninteracting treatment of schooling used in the earlier regressions turns
out perhaps not to have been egregiously wrong.
1V.Conclusions
The empirical results on the rural North Carolina families yield the
following propositions:
1.Increases in the wife's wage, measured either as her own wage-rate
earned or as a county average wage rate, reduce completed family size.
2.Increases in family income (measured not in annual money terms but
as a "permanent" annual flow of consumption services) increase family
size.
3.Increases in the wife's schooling decrease family size. This effect
persists and is changed only slightly whether the wife's wage rate is held
constant or not.
4.Nonwhite families have 1.2—1.3 more children than whites per com-
pleted family, celeris paribus. Their family sizes are also more responsive
to changes in schooling, wage rates, and income than are those for white
families in this sample.
5.Farm operators have about 0.4 more children per completed family
than rural-nonfarm residents, ceteris paribus.
6.Increases in the price of hired time, holding the wife's own wage
rate constant, decrease completed family size.
7.The husband's schooling and wage rate are both negatively related
to family size. The negative effect of husband's schooling is significantly
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schooling is significantly
larger for families in which the wife does not work than where she does, as
the home production model predicts. However, for nonworking wives, the
income elasticity of family size is greater than for working wives.
8.Neither the wife's nor husband's years of schooling are related
linearly to family size (though the nonlinearity appears greatly reduced
when interaction is allowed between husbands' and wives' schooling). For
women, increases from 0—4 through 9—11 years of schooling reduce family
size much more than increases from 9—11 through college. The men's non-
linearity is weaker and works in the opposite way; later years of schooling
reduce family size by more than earlier ones.
Propositions (1), (2),and(6) are consistent with the predictions of the
model. Results (3), (5), (7), and (8) may be plausibly interpreted in
terms of the home production model, but alternative explanations cannot
be ruled out.COMMENT
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Most of my discussion pertainstothe empirical work presentedin
Gardner's paper. I have no disagreement with the underlying theory,
wherein numbers and quality of children are expected to be related in
special and familiar ways to wealth endowments of households and to the
market prices which households face. Nor do I disagree with the author's
list of difficulties in the empirical estimation of the model—particularly the
problem of defining those endowments and prices that are truly exogenous
and the difficulties in measuring these variables at the times when decisions
are being made. Even if we accept the idea that parents make a "lifetime"
decision about the quantity of children they desire, we must work with
income and price data that only loosely apply to that "lifetime" period.
At the outset let me say that I find the qualitative results of the
empirical work quite acceptable. Gardner obtains positive income effects,
negative price effects, a positive effect for farm residents, and other reason-
able results in his models predicting family size. But Iwill question
whether the data and the statistical models used are adequate to yield
even approximately unbiased measures of these effects.
The Data and the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is not children-ever-born but rather, in the RTI
survey, children present ("some part of the year"). The biases this causes
is not clear a priori because there are two biases which may operate in
different directions. (1) On the one hand, and higher-
income people (high SES, for short) tend to marry at later ages than do
low-SES people. If we were using a children-ever-born variable, this would
mean that at any given age up to the year when the last child is born,
the SES relationship to fertility would appear negative, although it need
not be negative. (2) On the other hand, the low-SES parents will be
younger when their children begin to leave home as they grow up. As a
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consequence, the numbers of children present will be larger in the older
ages, say the late thirties, for the high-SES group, even though the
number of children-ever-born may be the same. If, as may be true, the
children in low-SES households tend to leave home at earlier ages, the bias
understating the numbers of children for these low-SES families increases.1
Depending on the frequency of these two types of biases, any positive
relation between numbers of children and income would be exaggerated,
and any negative between education and numbers would be
understated; or vice versa.
These biases are illustrated in table 1. With respect to the RTI survey,
it appears that bias (2),inwhich the SES-fertility relation is positively
biased, may dominate. In the examples given, there are more ages of the
wife when a high-SES woman will show a spuriously larger number of
children than the low-SES woman. The table also shows why Gardner had
to apply his rule excluding wives whose oldest child over age 15 was born
more than 5yearsafter the date of her marriage. Leaving in such wives
would have made bias (2) very large indeed. One additional distortion in
this sample is worth mentioning. A special treatment was accorded to
women who reported no children present. If these women were under age
46, they were counted as among the childless. As shown in table 1(see
"age 44"),thisprobably imparts a specific type of bias. Furthermore, all
women aged 46—49 with "no children present" were excluded, so even those
with "no children-ever-born" were omitted from the sample. One can only
speculate on how these excluded cases have affected Gardner's overall
results, especially in his tables 3 and 4, where the sample size was often
small and complicated interaction variables were analyzed.
The Independent Variables and Their Interpretation
Early in his discussion of the regressions Gardner remarks that education
may be standing as a proxy for tastes "against" children. I agree that it
might. But is it not also reasonable to expect that the wife's wage rate and
the husband's income are also correlated with tastes against children and
in favor of market goods? I would expect such correlations. It seems to me
that .this sort of bias fs a serious disadvantage when working with disag-
gregated data in
1Notethatchildrenattending collegewillprobably be counted as"children
living at home during at least some part of the year." Such cases would be more
common among high-SES families. Also adding to this direction of bias are the higher
death rates of children in the low-SES groups, but this may be negligible.
2 The standard argument is that women differ in a variety of genetic and "person.
ality"characteristics which may be contributing to both decisions about desired
fertility and decisions about wage earning capacities (human capital investments), the
choice of a husband regarding his income prospects (and his tastes for children), and
so on. Certain aggregations of the data may permit the assumption of a zero variance
in tastes, but this would have to be examined. If these tastes are unobservable, the
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TABLE 1
CHILDREN PRESENT4 BY AGE OF WIFE AND AGE OF MARRIAGE
GLEN G. CAIN
Low SES





No. of No. of
AOL AT MARRIAGEChildren Age of Oldest Children Age of Oldest
18 0 0 ... ...
19 0 0 ... ...
20 1 1 ... ...
21 1 2 ... .
22 2 3 ... ...
23 2 4 0 0
24 3 5 0 0
25 3 6 1 1
26 4 7 1 2
27 4 8 2 3
28 4 9 2 4
29 4 10 3 5
30t 4 11 3 6
31 4 12 4 7













2yearsapart, and the NOTE—The number of children.ever-bornis assumed
children are assumed to leave home at age 18.
The questionnaire asked about "children still living at home during at least some part of the year."
At age 30, the low-SES families appear (erroneously) to have a higher measure of children-ever.
born.
At ages 38,39,and 44, the high.SES families appear (erroneously) to have a higher measure of
children-ever.born,
§ Wives who would be excluded from the sample because the woman's year of marriage is greater
than 5 years earlier than the birth of the oldest child reported (unless the oldest child was less than
16 years old).
II Ages when there is an ambiguity regarding "no children present" being taken for "no children.
ever.born." In Gardner's treatment of this problem, women aged 46-49 with no children present are
excluded entirely, sothe spurious positive relation between SES anti fertilityisobserved for the
44•year.old women.
Now consider the specific matter of the income variable used. First,
regarding nonlabor income, the problem is not only that the amounts are
small and often inaccurately measured, but that they stem from special
"bias" goes unmeasured, and even the existence (or direction) of bias may be in
dispute, and the resolution will depend on one's judgment. In cases where some
proxyvariableservestomeasuretastes—statedattitudes,forexample—itwill
probably turn out that these proxies are endogenous and depend on the wage, income,
and fertility variables. But, clearly, such simultaneity in .the relations does not negate
the validity of the general point that the omission of tastes generates a bias in the
estimated coefficients of the wage and income variables in models predicting fertility.
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sources that may reveal special characteristics of the families. With in-
comes generally low, as in this sample, dividends, interest, and capital
gains are minor. Public assistance in the form of aid to dependent children
would introduce a "price effect," but this is probably not important in this
sample, since female heads were excluded. Unemployment compensation is
a temporary grant that should have no effect on fertility. Disability pay-
ments may represent characteristics that have an effect on fertility, but not
because of the "pure" income effect. Rent receipts may indicate having a
large house, and the rent relation to past' fertility behavior may stem from
the correlation with housing expenditure rather than from a "pure" income
effect.
Second, I am surprised to see consumption expenditures appearing on
the right-hand side of the equation that has family size on the left-hand
side. For decades econometric work has used family size as a presumed
exogenous variable determining consumption and savings decisions.3I
cannot accept the implicit assumption that consumption expenditures is
an exogenous variable determining family size. There are, as Gardner
suggests, numerous problems of simultaneity in the fertility model he
presents, but this one, which he does not mention, seems to me one of the
most serious.
Gardner considers as an innovation the use of an areal aggregate wage
rate for wives in their county of residence as an independent variable in
a regression with the wife's number of children as dependent variable.
After noting the problem of an endogenous "experience" component in the
wife's own reported wage, he claims that the area wage is truly exogenous.4
I would argue against this claim. First, consider the regression of average
county fertility rates on average county female wage rates. The potential
problem of simultaneity here is that (a) average fertility rates will act as
a proxy for average "experience," and the latter affects the average wage:
and (b) the average female wage rate will depend on the labor supply of
females, which has been admitted to be a variable that is simultaneously
determined along with fertility decisions. Now, I claim that the algebra of
least-squares fitting produces regression coefficients in Gardner's specifica-
tion which match just this regression of average county fertility rates on
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3To cite just one study, although a particularly appropriate one, see H. Watts and
J. Tobin (1969). Family size was generally positively related to both stocks of assets
and current consumption (more precisely, negatively related to current savings), and
precisely these two entities define Gardner's "permanent-consumption" measure of
income.
an aside,I would argue with Gardner's contention that his procedure of
dividing days worked into aggregate income tends to bias the wife's wage rate co-
efficient toward zero. Consider that small-sized families will find it easier to accumu-
late savings in the form of assets that yield money income. Counties with larger
numbers of these types of families will show up with higher wage rates for wives
because the numerator includes a lot of nonlabor income. A negative relation between
the "wage rate" and fertility is produced which is partly spurious.188 GLEN G. CAIN
average county female wage rates (actuafly, a regression weighted by the
number of observations in each county). Such area regressions are useful,
despite the simultaneity problems that arise, but Gardner's specification
offers nothing substantively innovative.
Another problem that must be considered—one that is confronted most
explicitly when using cross-section area aggregates—is that of selective
migration. It seems to me highly plausible that, for example, women who
have tastes for market work (or for a "career") and for having few children
would migrate to areas where they would find better employment oppor-
tunities. The measured negative correlation between female earnings (or
wages) and numbers of children would then be partly spurious—at least
spurious in comparison to the effects of changes in wages on the quantity
of children that we would expect to see in a time series. I suggest further
that the smaller is the total area from which the population is drawn, the
more likely is selective migration a problem since interarea mobility is
greater. The use of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), or
even counties, in the United States as a whole is better, I believe, than
Gardner's use of counties within a single state. (Worse still would be the
use of neighborhoods or tracts within a single city.)
I conclude that there are serious problems in accepting the regression
coefficients in this paper as even approximately unbiased. The income co-
efficients appear biased up because of the simultaneity problem, the
"tastes" correlation, and because of the sample exclusions and fertility-
definitional problem. The wage-rate coefficient appears biased down (too
large a negative number) because of the simultaneity problem, the "tastes"
correlation, and selective migration phenomena. We have no way of judg-
ing the seriousness of these biases, and so my view of the empirical work is
reserved: the evidence presented is, however, consistent with the price
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